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Foreword
The decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the LaGrand
Case signals a significant shift in the interpretation of the ICJ's injunctive
authority that is likely to impact the future work of international courts and
tribunals. For the first time, the ICJ clearly states that provisional orders it
issues under Article 41 of the ICJ Statute have binding effect, and that parties
have a legal obligation to adhere to such orders. What has helped LaGrand
become a prime topic for international legal discourse, however, is the
intertwining of this structural change with another highly controversial issue
in international law-that of capital punishment.
Karl and Walter LaGrand were German nationals who, despite having
lived in the United States for almost all of their lives, had never acquired
United States citizenship. Arrested in Arizona in 1982 in association with a
bank robbery, they were convicted by the Superior Court of Arizona in 1984
for murder in the first degree, attempted murder in the first degree, attempted
armed robbery, and kidnapping. They were subsequently sentenced to death.
Under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, to
which both Germany and the United States are parties, a state that has
detained a foreign national within its jurisdiction shall, upon the detainee's
request, inform the consular post of such foreign national's state of the
detention. In addition, the detaining authority shall inform the detainee of his
or her rights to such communication. In the LaGrand brothers' case, the
relevant U.S. authorities informed neither the brothers of their rights, nor the
German consular post of the arrest. While the authorities in Arizona may have
been unaware of the LaGrands' German nationality at the time of the arrest,
they also did not inform the relevant parties of their Article 36 rights after
discovering that information. It was only in 1992 that the LaGrands
independently discovered their rights and informed the German consulate of
their case.
After exhausting the state level appellate process, during which they
remained uninformed of their Vienna Convention rights, the LaGrands sought
relief by instituting a new set of proceedings at the federal level. Among the
various claims the brothers asserted was that the U.S. authorities' failure to
inform them of their Vienna Convention rights constituted a procedural defect
that required the federal court to set aside their conviction or death sentence.
The federal district court, however, rejected this claim on the ground of
"procedural default"--as a matter of procedure, a state defendant seeking
habeas corpus in a federal court may not raise a new issue that was not
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previously presented to a state court without showing an external impediment
or prejudice that is obvious on its face. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit subsequently affirmed the "procedural default" ruling.
Subsequent to Arizona's execution of Karl LaGrand on February 24,
1999, Germany filed actions against the United States in the U.S. Supreme
Court and the ICJ to prevent the execution of Walter LaGrand. While the U.S.
Supreme Court, citing tardiness of pleas and jurisdictional barriers, refused to
exercise jurisdiction, the ICJ issued provisional measures on March 3, 1999,
ordering the United States to "take all measures at its disposal to ensure that
Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the final decision in these
proceedings," and stating that the United States "should inform the Court of
all the measures which it has taken in implementation of this Order." The ICJ
also ordered the U.S. government to transmit the order to the Governor of
Arizona. Germany immediately appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which
refused to exercise its jurisdiction to enforce the ICJ's order. Later that day,
Walter LaGrand was executed.
Two years later, the ICJ issued its final judgment in the LaGrand Case.
After dismissing challenges to its jurisdiction, the court stated that the United
States violated Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, with respect to both
Germany and the LaGrands; that the "procedural default" rule could not
excuse the United States from exercising its international legal obligations;
that provisional measures issued by the ICJ are binding on the United States,
which failed to carry out the court's instructions; and that the United States
should prevent such violations in the future.
The ICJ's ruling immediately touched off a vigorous debate among
international legal scholars regarding the court's stance on the nature of its
provisional measures. Proponents of the view that these are binding orders
generally argue that for such injunctive measures to have any significance,
individual states must be held to the obligation to follow provisional measures
with minimal regard for domestic legal or political constraints; LaGrand, they
believe, demonstrates the likely detrimental effects a nonbinding order may
have on both the individual and structural levels. Critics of the ICJ's position
argue, on the other hand, that not only does the vague language contained in
Article 41 of the ICJ statute support a much weaker obligation on the part of
individual states, but that the court may in fact be undermining its own
legitimacy by adopting such a strong stance in the face of the high likelihood
that states will continue to disregard future provisional measures to protect
their individual interests.
This symposium presents perspectives on the significance of the ICJ
decision that reflect the divide among international legal scholars. In The
Unreality of International Law in the United States and the LaGrand Case,
Professor Joan Fitzpatrick offers seven "lessons" from LaGrand as
exemplifying a broader resistance on the part of the United States to view
international law as a meaningful constraint on the conduct of domestic
officials. From the perspective of the practical import of the decision,
Fitzpatrick reviews domestic case law to conclude that the ICJ decision has
not resulted in a notable improvement in the United States' recalcitrant
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practice regarding consular access under Article 36 of the Convention. Thus,
among the "most profound" implications of the decision for Fitzpatrick is the
possibility that, despite LaGrand's clarification of the binding legal nature of
provisional measures, the poor record of state compliance may persist,
undermining the ICJ's authority.
In LaGrand: A Challenge to the U.S. Judiciary, Professor John Quigley
presents a more optimistic view of the significance of the decision. Quigley
notes that the judgment poses challenges to U.S. courts because the ICJ
presents a different view of the consequences of violating Article 36, the
rights of individual detainees under the Vienna Convention, and the legal
nature of interim measures. Quigley analyzes the significant disagreement
between the ICJ and the United States on each of these points to conclude that
the Court's sound legal reasoning should recommend itself to the U.S.
Supreme Court, and that U.S. courts at the federal and state levels should
honor interim measures "lest they put the United States in violation of its
obligation to comply" with the Vienna Convention. In stark contrast to
Fitzpatrick's view that the "reciprocity of treaty obligations provides
insufficient leverage to induce U.S. compliance with treaty obligations,"
Quigley concludes the opposite-that LaGrand should encourage the U.S. to
reassess its position precisely because the country has more consuls than any
other state, and thus "more to gain from the strict observance of the right of
consular access."
In Recognizing Guarantees and Assurances of Non-Repetition:
LaGrand and the Law of State Responsibility, Christian Tams focuses on the
first of the three aspects highlighted in Quigley's contribution: the
consequences of violating Article 36. Tams argues that the ICJ, by
recognizing that a state injured by a breach of international law may be
entitled to demand from the violating state guarantees and assurances that the
breach will not be repeated, has influenced the legal rules governing the
consequences of international wrongs. Tams' perspective departs from
Fitzpatrick's view that the ICJ's failure to specify a precise remedial action
facilitates noncompliance and "leaves U.S. courts adrift," as well as from
Quigley's point that the Court did not specifically order assurances of non-
repetition. Far from LaGrand being "unduly vague," Tams contends that the
Court's recognition of guarantees and assurances is indicative of an important
trend towards a broader approach to the law of state responsibility.
Finally, in The ICJ Ruling Against the United States, Professor William
Schabas picks up on Mr. Tams' forward-looking conclusion that LaGrand's
significance lies primarily in its contribution to the resolution of future cases.
Schabas argues that the ICJ, by handing down an unequivocal statement of the
binding nature of provisional measures, did much to advance the protection of
individuals facing capital punishment. From Schabas' perspective, the
significance of LaGrand lies in the Court's failure to confine its ruling to
questions of the interpretation of its own statute, suggesting instead, that an
inherent function of adjudicative bodies is to order interim measures that
prevent irreparable harm by preserving the status quo. Thus, despite the best
efforts of the parties in LaGrand to maintain the death penalty as a mere
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"subtext," Schabas concludes that the decision is "very much about" capital
punishment. According to Schabas, the Court has handed a powerful
precedent to international human rights bodies that regularly confront death
penalty issues-one that invites transposition of the principle to national
courts when international treaty bodies are involved.
